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International capital markets have grown to be a major force shaping today's world 
economy, presenting a range of opportunities and threats to developing countries.  
Capital market liberalization created large pools of much-needed capital that developing 
economies could access, but tapping these funds often came at the cost of increasing 
economic vulnerability, lost policy-making autonomy and a range of structural 
distortions that could ultimately undermine development in the long-term.  As the 
potential threats of integrating one's country into global capital markets has become 
apparent, countries have devised a range of strategies to buffer themselves from the 
strains of global capital markets.  This article considers the pursuit of monetary 
autonomy with reference to a typology of the strategies that policy-makers can use to 
open their markets to international capital, while simultaneously attempting to buffer 
themselves from the economic and political pressures of global financial integration.  
Such autonomy can be purchased in a myriad of ways, and a discussion of the choices 
facing Latin American and Eastern European countries is presented. 
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Globalization and economic liberalization promised developing countries improved 
opportunities for capital investment and, in turn, accelerated economic development.  These promises 
helped cultivate a rush across the developing world to create favorable conditions for capital investors.  
Increased inward capital flows did occur, but frequently retreated rapidly, helped spark systemic 
volatility and, for many countries, ultimately resulted in a disappointing development record (Rodrik and 
Subramanian 2008).  By the turn of the millennium, there emerged a strong sense that the interests of 
capital investors and national economic development could diverge and even oppose one another.  
Governments increasingly saw global capital markets as a potentially destructive force, and sought ways 
to manage the perils of modern financial capitalism. 
Today’s enlarged, mobile and powerful global capital markets present policy-makers with a 
tightrope.  These markets can undermine development efforts as easily as they help, but there are many 
means by which governments can insulate their economies from these adverse effects.  This chapter 
focuses on how governments can manage capital markets strains with a special focus on monetary 
policy.  Strains occur when there is a rapid and/or sustained flight of resources from a national money, 
which can create a range of policy problems when it occurs, including currency devaluation, inflation, 
government insolvency, and bankruptcy epidemics.  When a monetary system becomes especially 
unstable, it can hurt economic prosperity and, in extreme cases, undermine general political-economic 
order.     
Under many circumstances, opening one’s markets to global capital flows creates increased risk 
of monetary problems that policy-makers can attempt to mitigate by various means.  Five generic 
strategies for insuring one’s economy against capital market strain are considered.  Incentivization 
attempts to discourage capital flight by making one’s economy maximally attractive for capital investors.  
Intervention attempts to impede capital flight by using the state’s legal powers and resources to restrict 
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or manipulate the movement of capital.   Financial accumulation is a strategy in which governments 
attempt to arm themselves with access to large pools of financing that can be used to act against market 
sentiment on markets themselves.  Cooperation involves coordination among states that pool resources 
to act against markets.  Dependency is an arrangement in which a weaker country surrenders economic 
sovereignty to a stronger one in exchange for the latter’s sponsorship of monetary stability.  Each of 
these strategies face practical difficulties and potential problems. 
Countries in Latin America and Eastern Europe will have to consider the blend of monetary 
defense strategies that they will use in the years to come.  Many European countries have sought refuge 
in the European Monetary Union.  This arrangement offers first-rate monetary protection, but places 
them in a position in which the strains of dependency could eventually be strong, although the system’s 
current workings seem to be more cooperative in nature.  Concerns that political shifts may change the 
Euro bloc into something that serves the interests of its core countries, perhaps at the expensive of the 
newly-admitted, is an issue that policy-makers in that region will have to engage.  In Latin America, 
these choices are more complicated.  Cooperative and dependency arrangements look less desirable, 
and accumulation somewhat less practical.  The region seems stuck with blends of incentives and 
interventions, which are likely to be less effective than European options.  What may help the region 
most is a change in attitudes among the world system’s core countries on their role in fostering global 
development. 
Managing Money under Financial Capitalism: Some Preliminaries 
Policy-makers embraced financial liberalization for many reasons, particularly a belief that it 
would rescue them from the economic quagmires of the 1970s and 1980s.  By engaging markets, these 
countries exposed their economies to financial pressures that affected economic stability, policy-making 
autonomy and, in turn, the social infrastructure by which their economies were organized.  Capital flows 
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grew to be large and volatile, and often overwhelmed governments’ ability to maintain financial order 
and ultimately may have undermined economic progress.  The destructive side of the global financial 
boom is a force that policy-makers now respect, and present an important consideration that should be 
integrated into any national economic strategy. 
The Rise of Financial Capitalism.  After World War II, the Western allies sought to embed 
financial markets in a web of stringent, cooperatively-enforced regulations institutionalized in the 
Bretton Woods Accord of 1944.  This accord established a regime of coordinated exchange rate fixing, 
mutual macrofinancial insurance and active public sector control of financial markets.  It was pursued in 
part as a result of the practical difficulties involved in reestablishing the liberal prewar international 
economic regime, in part to insulate governments from the tumult that resulted in the Great 
Depression, and in part in an effort to protect government policy-making from pressures from financial 
markets (Bordo 1993; Helleiner 1994; Ruggie 1982; Sachs and Warner 1995).  By controlling capital’s 
ability to shake exchange rates, price system stability or government solvency, private financiers’ ability 
to sanction governments for enacting anti-capital policies were limited, thereby helping states institute 
the interventionist policies of the mid-20th century (Cohen 2008).  The participation of the world 
system’s core members suppressed financial volatility globally. 
This system faced a slow chipping-away in the 1950s and 1960s, then a breakdown by 1971 (see 
Block 1977; Helleiner 1994).  The 1973 oil shock created a combination of serious economic stagflation 
across the world and an environment of very loose credit for governments, which culminated in states 
weathering economic crises through deficit spending.  Governments accumulated massive debts, 
culminating in a financial crisis in 1982.  Insolvent governments faced an inability to finance their 
operations, political gridlock proved to be a hurdle to aggressive financial restoration, and many policy-
makers addressed this situation through seigniorage.  The result was severe inflation and chronic 
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stagnation throughout the 1980s, amounting to a “lost decade” of development for many countries.  
What seemed to be the patent failure of governments’ macroeconomic management delegitimized the 
postwar portrayal of the state as a prudent safeguard against market excesses, and helped usher in a 
range of policy initiatives designed to cut the state’s size, scope of operations and regulatory hold on 
markets.  The collapse of the Soviet system by the 1990s solidified sentiments that opposed government 
interventionism, and brought many of the world’s developing states into this rising liberal system. 
Excitement about the Cold War’s end and opportunities for capital infusion-led economic 
development triggered an “emerging markets” investment boom in the 1990s.  Global financial flows 
grew to be large.  Median gross FDI and gross private capital flows grew by factors of almost four and 
seven respectively, as a percentage of GDP at the median between the 1980s and 2000s.  Among the 
top quartile of wealthier countries, market capitalization of listed companies almost tripled from the 
1980s to 2000s, as more of their countries assets were channeled to equity markets.  Through 
government and private sectors, capital poured into developing countries, introducing capital inflows on 
a previously-unseen scale, and for which unprepared regulatory authorities and immature financial 
institutions had not been ready.  The degree to which these doors were opened to capital varied (see 
Taylor 2006), but everywhere emerging capital markets were a force that took root in economic life. 
Liberalization not only opened the doors to financial inflows but also outflows, and the 1990s 
showed the money could flee a country easily and sometimes in ways that suggested indiscriminate 
panic or sanction.  These crises could occur unexpectedly and for reasons not direct tied to identifiable 
underlying problems, for example as the result of financial communities’ self-fulfilling prophesies of 
impending panic (Obstfeld 1996) or as a form of collective punishment resulting from general flights 
from all developing markets when particular countries or regions fell into problems (Fratzscher 2003; 
Kaminsky and Reinhart 2000).  The economic costs of such crises could be profound, sparking exchange 
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rate drops, inflation, trade disruption, credit crises and severe recessions.  In extreme cases, such as 
Indonesia in 1998 or Argentina in 2001, financial crises unleashed political crises, undermined social 
order and destabilized states. 
Financial Pressures under Economic Liberalism.  Contemporary economic history shows that 
adverse reactions by capital markets can hurt an economy, and in turn threaten a political regime’s 
tenure.  The destructive capacity of capital flight is a threat of which policy-makers are aware, and has 
been argued to sway the economic policies that countries adopt.  In this way, some argue that financial 
liberalization undercuts the autonomy of policy-makers, who are pushed to tailor policies to the 
interests of international capital holders (Andrews 1994; Haggard and Maxfield 1996).  Financial 
pressures’ encroachment on policy is most visible when countries fall into crisis.  Under these 
circumstances, victims have sometimes found themselves having to make policy concessions to external 
bailout financiers, for example through IMF conditionality (reviewed in Dreher 2008) or in bilateral 
negotiations (e.g., see Kirshner 2006 on South Korea's concessions to the US after its 1997 crisis).  Even 
in the absence of crisis, governments might anticipate capital markets’ desires, and implement policies 
that prioritize catering to that sector’s demands, even at the expense of other national economic 
priorities.   
Such an encroachment on autonomy made sense after the 1980s, when governments appeared 
to use their power over the regulatory environment to make patently misconceived, or even politically-
expedient, financial decisions, often in ways that seemed to be at the expense of the economy-at-large.  
Giving capital markets power over the economy makes sense as long as we assume that there is an 
affinity between the interests of capital investors and general economic prosperity.  Given the overall 
questionable effect of financial globalization’s effect on development, assuming such an affinity seems 
hasty.  Some kinds of policy concessions are ones that reduce regulation or maximize the ease with 
Joseph Nathan Cohen  Managing the Faustian Bargain 
6 
 
which they can flee an economy, precisely the kinds of reforms that make countries more vulnerable to 
strain.  In some cases, financial concerns can lead governments to enact policies that disadvantage other 
economically-important sectors.  For example, artificially inflating a country’s exchange rates can reduce 
the risk to which locally-denominated debt-holders are exposed, but it also hurts exports.  Providing tax 
inducements to foreign investors shifts the tax burden to local enterprise and consumers, and does 
nothing to help bolster government finances if liberalization does not help spur strong development.  At 
best, the development benefit of financial liberalization appears to be mixed (Kose et al. 2006). 
Seeking a Defensive Posture.  Over the past decade, perspectives on the ultimate benevolence 
of free international capital markets have changed.  Rodrik and Subramanian (2008) argue that the net 
development effect of capital market liberalization has been “disappointing”, and suggest that part of 
the problem is that opening the doors to capital does not mean that investment opportunities in the 
potential recipient country will be good.  A mere welcoming of capital as a solution to economic 
problems does nothing to help the many, underlying institutional conditions that influence investment 
viability, and trying to wholesale change institutions and liberalize a wide range of markets all at once is 
likely an impractical endeavor.  History suggests that any multitude of underlying problems can make a 
country vulnerable to the flight of the capital upon which they come to depend, and prominent analysts 
have argued that capital markets are something against which countries should defend themselves 
(Feldstein 1999).  How can a country achieve such insulation?  Countries have pursued numerous 
strategies in the 21st century, each of which has its own costs and benefits.  We turn to a typology of 
these strategies next. 
Maintaining Monetary Autonomy: Five Generic Strategies 
Monetary autonomy refers to a situation in which government policy is not pressured by 
financial markets, and thus does not have to grapple with the threat of economic crisis and is not 
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pushed to implement pro-financier policies (see Cohen 2008).  As recent events in the US suggest, no 
country is fully insulated from these pressures, but differences in exposure to these forces exist.  A 
policy-maker seeking to mitigate international financial markets’ encroachments on the policy-making 
process has several potential strategies at his or her disposal.  Below, I present a typology of five such 
strategies: incentivization, intervention, accumulation, coordination and dependency.  Each strategy has 
its own costs and benefits. 
Incentivization 
Strictly speaking, the hands of government can be tied by situations that policy itself has 
created.  This occurred in the 1980s, when monetary systems confronted a myriad of problems, many of 
which were government policy’s own making.  Political forces sway the state, and this context ushered 
in policy directives that served to erode general economic order and formal economy participation, 
often leaving these countries with largely ungovernable economies.  Morales and Sachs (1989) 
discussion of Bolivia’s Siles administration is an illustrative example.  Given this paper’s basic premise 
that the threat of capital flight is a key pressure on policy-makers, such a strategy might seem wrong-
headed at first glance.  Seeing its underlying logic requires a conceptual separation of the state from a 
country’s political forces, and an acknowledgement that certain political environments can cripple a 
state’s ability to manage its own economy.  Financial systems represent social orders, and such orders 
can fall into a kind of chaos that neither the government nor private enterprise can control well.   
A reestablishment of governments’ sway over economic activity required a restoration of price 
stability and public finances.  One way to do this is to privatize the economy and chase global capital, 
which can infuse an economy with hard currencies, shed costly and politically-charged public 
enterprises, and help alleviate pressures on balances of payments and fiscal deficits, and, perhaps most 
importantly, undercut bad governments’ policy-making autonomy.  The Washington Consensus and 
similar reforms can be seen as a cover for the tough decisions that seemed impossible through strictly 
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domestic deliberations.  Although some portray economic liberalization as a choice that was an 
imposition for foreigners’ will on developing countries, closer examinations suggest that domestic 
constituencies have also favored such reforms (e.g., Armijo and Faucher 2002). 
Many of the policies implemented under the early 1990s’ wave of liberalization could be 
described as incentivization, a means of asserting state economic control by attempting to reestablish 
financial order through attracting needed capital inflows by maximizing the incentives international 
financiers have to transfer resources into a developing country.   Some of these reform include basic 
elements of the original Washington Consensus – privatization, deregulation, tax and expenditure 
reduction, easing restrictions on foreign inward investment and the reinforcement of property rights, 
though the liberalization of capital outflows was not part of this consensus (Williamson 1990).  Once 
basic reforms were implemented, however, capital outflow liberalization was soon argued to help 
inflows and were ultimately implemented (Labán M. and Larraín B. 2001; Schadler et al. 1993).  
The chief benefits of these liberalization strategies are that they help countries make difficult 
decisions by externalizing the cause of politically-difficult decisions (Przeworski and Vreeland 2000), like 
unloading money-losing public enterprises or cutting government expenditures.  They also help establish 
basic environmental conditions that are likely to be necessary if a country wants to enjoy any of the 
benefits conferred by First World financial systems, like strong property rights or effective contract 
enforcement.  The global investment boom and widespread quelling of inflation during the 1990s (see 
Cohen and Centeno 2006) suggesting that liberalization can provide governments and economies with 
the resources to quell stagflation.  It also seems clear that, regardless of the financial pressures faced by 
governments since 1990s, developing countries’ states have a dramatically enhanced ability to exert 
fiscal and monetary power within their own economies. 
Joseph Nathan Cohen  Managing the Faustian Bargain 
9 
 
Problems with this strategy emerge when a country is no longer mired in general economic 
crisis, and there is actually large amounts of circulating capital to flee.  At such a point, the interests of 
the state and international capital markets can diverge.  States may want to regain lost control of 
privatized strategic sectors, as many countries did with their oil deposits over the past decade.  They 
might want successful foreign-owned enterprises to help fund public initiatives, and try to raise the 
taxes levied on them.  Once capital flight emerges as a threat to national prosperity, governments may 
want to restrict capital mobility to retain its existing capital or prevent disruptions from hot money.  All 
of these solutions are problematic.  In one sense, they can amount to a violation of an implicit contract 
with capital markets, who often assume the risk of entering troubled markets in hopes of large future 
profits.  Changing these terms can lead to reputation damage, and perhaps future prospects for 
attracting investment.  Some reassertions of state ownership can amount to serious violations of 
property rights, like the recapture of oil rights by Russia, Venezuela or Bolivia.  Also, opening the door to 
international capital markets creates entrenched interest groups and institutions, and undoing these 
policies can spark serious political conflict and strain relationships with investors’ home countries. 
Incentivization appears to have been used as a crisis strategy, which comes at the cost of lock-in 
to external vulnerability and control over strategically-important parts of the economy.  At some point, 
the interests of international capital markets and domestic development may diverge, making countries 
vulnerable to many of the problems that came up during the 1990s.  In this sense, one can characterize 
incentivization as a kind of Faustian bargain: to sell control over one’s economy to international markets 
to alleviate crisis, but then have to live with their potentially-negative influence once the crisis has 
passed.   
Intervention 
Intervention is a means of asserting governments’ economic power by using legal power and 
prerogatives to constrain or influence the choices available to international investors.  While the 1990s 
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has been characterized here as an era of rapid liberalization and financial deregulation, it is important to 
note that most governments engaged in piecemeal reforms, holding on to many mechanisms of 
regulatory control.  Examples of such interventions include capital flow restrictions, regulated direct 
investment, restrictions on foreign borrowing or exchange rate manipulations, and were retained in 
various combinations across the developing world  (see Taylor 2006).   
As noted earlier, governments resorted to strong capital controls during the mid-20th century, 
although many observers argue that they were poorly-conceived and often circumvented  (Bruton 1998; 
Isard 2005).  More generally, tight financial regulation is thought by many laissez-faire proponents to 
eschew some of the free market’s primary benefits.  They make capital allocation subject to purely 
political pressures, can suppress the information transmission that takes place through price changes, 
and saddle policy-makers with the impractical task of fine-tuning a capital allocation system that must 
fund something as staggeringly complex as an aggregate economy.  Such regulations may also shift 
enterprises attention away from innovation and productivity enhancement towards lobbying (Krueger 
1974).  Furthermore, they have a record of not working well, and have been dismissed by some 
observers as relics of a policy ideology whose time has passed (Dornbusch 1998).  Finally, such 
regulations may discourage the inflow of capital that provides a key incentive for engaging these 
markets in the first place.   
Since 1997, analysts have become more skeptical about the development-related benefits of 
capital market integration.  Attitudes towards capital controls have become more positive, particularly 
with respect to restrictions on short-term flows (e.g., Montiel and Reinhart 1999).  Regulation has also 
become more topical given recent financial problems in the United States, which was itself a principle 
source of advocacy for the benefits of unfettered financial markets.   Overall, there is a deep 
ambivalence about the use of regulation to steer financial market outcomes among policy experts.  This 
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uncertainty reflects the view that many forms of financial market regulation can be undermined, even 
while actors nominally adhere to the letter of its policies (Healy and Palepu 2003).  Americans have 
shown an inclination to deal with financial problems by enacting policies designed to maximize 
transparency in financial reporting (like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act), although such redresses have been 
criticized as ignoring fundamental problems associated with financial systems that still leave much 
financial power in the hands of private actors and thus remain vulnerable to the systematic failing of 
laissez-faire systems (e.g., Soederberg 2008).  A central problem with intervention is that policy is much 
less nimble than capital markets, and private actors can find a myriad of ways to circumvent them.  
Regulation nevertheless remains a practical option for coping with perceived problems in the financial 
system, given that governments can implement them unilaterally.   
Financial Accumulation 
A country seeking to forge its own counterweight to markets need not act against the basic logic 
of the market, but rather attempt to forge autonomy from markets through markets.  Financial 
accumulation is a strategy in which countries acquire large reserves, and deploy these reserves to buy 
against market sentiment in times of financial panic.  The idea here is that many strains are a product of 
herding behavior and panic about impending collapse.  One way to insulate a country from the early 
onset of financial strain is to buy up excess supplies of one’s own currency on markets, or, failing that, 
use reserves to finance strategically-important imports or debt obligations.  This is a delaying tactic (B. 
Cohen 2006), and is premised on the idea that many strains are essentially short-lived, unless the 
momentum of a currency crash and extended crisis leads to sustained losses of faith in a country’s 
currency.  Should a government help its own currency weather the storms of a panic, other market 
actors might begin to speculate in favor of currency appreciation, or, failing that, governments are given 
the time to find longer-term bailout financing to start the process of financial recovery.  This tactic is not 
likely to be sustainable over a longer period of time, as currency market turnover dwarfs most countries’ 
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capacity to hoard reserves.  In 2005, daily global forex turnover was estimated to be $1.8 trillion (Bank 
for International Settlements 2005), while most countries bank less than $100 billion in reserves 
(International Monetary Fund 2008). 
Reserve accumulation is typically explained as the result of currency sterilization, although time-
series data suggests that reserve hoarding accelerated after the 1994 Mexican peso crisis, and rose 
rapidly after the 1997 East Asian Crisis (Cohen 2008).  During this period, reserve holdings rose across 
the world, even in countries that were suffering from balance of payments deficits.  In a recent study, I 
show that developing countries that have banked reserves experience faster economic growth, net of 
other commonly-cited growth determinants and the potential effects of currency sterilization (Cohen 
2008).  Reserve accumulation appears to be a strategy that pays off, perhaps by smoothing the chronic 
boom-and-bust cycles that have plagued economic development in the late-20th century, and much of 
the world’s policy-makers appear to be cognizant of these benefits, given that such a wide range of 
countries have stocked reserves that are huge by historical standards. 
A key benefit of this strategy is that it attempts to control the excesses of markets without 
violating the basic logic of the market.  Banking reserves does nothing to threaten property rights, nor 
presents any problems to the original terms of investment in which capital first entered the developing 
world.  It need not create calcified rules that distort economic allocation.  Reserve banking is unlikely to 
attract the ire of the world system’s most dominant players, especially the US, particularly because 
America relies on this reserve hoarding to sustain its own large budget deficits.  Some argue that 
America’s reliance on this reserve banking helps developing countries gain influence over US policy 
(Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber 2003; 2004).  This strategy may be a difficult option in practice for 
many countries, as it requires a form of savings from governments that are already hard-pressed to find 
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financial surpluses.  Furthermore, although there is some evidence suggests that it is effective, the 
strategy may face practical limits once it is seriously tested.   
Cooperation 
A fourth option for countries seeking insulation from international capital markets is 
cooperation, in which countries engage in a form of mutual insurance against capital market strain.  The 
basic idea here is that individual countries may lack the reserves, regulatory power and other resources 
to contain the vast majority of strains on a currency, but their chances improve as their resources are 
pooled.  Arguably the Bretton Woods Accord, which successfully contained capital market excesses for 
roughly two decades, was such an arrangement, whereby the victorious Allied countries pooled 
resources and capacities to ensure that financial pressure would not inordinately affect the Accord 
members’ efforts to reform their economies after WWII.  More recently, the European Monetary Union 
can be seen as a form of coordination, in which its countries jointly face strains to the Euro together, 
and do so within a governance framework that gives reasonable influence to smaller countries.   
The Euro illustrates some of the benefits of coordination among strong players.  Together, EMU 
members command large reserves, hold regulatory jurisdiction over many important private sector 
actors, and have been able to create a strong currency that commands a significant proportion (roughly 
one-third) of international currency market turnover.  This last feature of the Euro is especially 
important, because the integrity of the global financial order is reasonably dependent on a stable Euro.  
Serious threats to this currency likely pose problems across the world system, meaning that it is likely 
that Europe would enjoy cooperation from a range of non-EMU countries, and perhaps major non-
governmental actors, should a serious threat emerge. 
Like any form of insurance, there exists the threat of a free rider problem, whereby a particular 
member feels empowered to make financially irresponsible decisions, like running large budget deficits, 
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without worrying about the repercussions that would follow under  independence, in effect passing the 
burden of monetary stabilization to others.  Within the Euro framework, the imposition of financial 
discipline has been reasonably successful, to the point that it might encourage it in countries that might 
not pursue prudent policy if they weren’t in, or aspiring to join, the Union.   For other regions, 
particularly those with a history of chronically resorting to deficit spending  or inflationary policy, like 
Latin America, it may not be as easy to find the political will to impose such discipline for the purposes of 
fortifying a mutual insurance pact, given that they often cannot find the will to insulate themselves. 
Moreover, some regions are unlikely to be able to pool enough economic power and resources 
to effectively control markets’ impact.  Regions like Latin America or Africa are populated by financially-
strained governments that hold regulatory power over relatively minor players in the global financial 
system.   Furthermore, efforts to unionize have reportedly been met with opposition from the United 
States, for example in its opposition to the formation of the Asian Monetary Fund proposal after the 
1997 East Asian Crisis (Kirshner 2006).  Coordination among developing countries may represent a 
threat to US financial dominance, and that country may be willing to squash efforts that erode their 
influence if it is able to do so.   
Even without formal pacts, there is a possibility that de facto coordination exists among some 
countries.  Benjamin Cohen (2006) argues that, beyond the power to delay the effects of monetary 
strain, countries may also be able to defend themselves from shock by “deflecting” their impact by 
enlisting the help of other countries that are likely to suffer should the afflicted economic system 
collapse.  For example, it seems unlikely that the advanced industrial countries would allow one of its 
own currencies to collapse, given the amount of interdependency that exists among them and the 
broader geostrategic implications of allowing a key ally to fall into critical crisis.  America’s rapid 
response to Mexico in 1994 suggests that, when confronted with a financial threat that could levy 
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severe problems on the United States itself, that country is ready to help quickly.  Although its tough 
bargaining with South Korea in 1997 may offer a counter-example, that country was ultimately given 
help and not left to the total collapse to which was Argentina was subjected in 2001.  Other central 
banks have been quick to extend credit to the US during the present mortgage crisis.  Coordination may 
be effective for wealthy countries, but has been difficult to implement elsewhere. 
Dependency 
There is a fine line between cooperation among mutually-defending countries and dependency 
relationships that act as a means by which powerful countries can coerce or exploit minor ones.  
Dependency is a monetary defense strategy in which an economically weaker country submits to 
bargaining terms largely drawn out by a larger power, in hopes that it will stabilize a financial system.  
Jonathan Kirshner (1995) offers comprehensive discussions of monetary dependency.   Given that it is 
rare for countries in an economic pact to have the kind of financial parity that exists between, for 
example, France and Germany, one might expect any political arrangement at mutual defense may also 
provide stronger countries opportunities to wield power over smaller countries that depend on that 
pact.   
Dependency can be a helpful strategy for coping with monetary strain, provided that these 
dependent relationships benefit (or at least not exploit) the weaker country.   A transnational monetary 
relationship is rarely a clear manifestation of dependency or cooperation, as most official discourse will 
describe such relationships as if they were the latter, and may even be seen by its participants in such 
terms.  There are clear examples of power plays that expose the vulnerabilities that can inhere in 
dependency relationships.  Kirshner (1995: 121 - 140) offers an extended discussion of how 1930s 
Germany was able to exploit currency difficulties in Southeastern Europe to bind these countries to a 
stabilization plan that relied on the Reichsmark, thereby creating a sense of common economic fate 
among these countries and Germany, and perhaps increased economic and political influence from the 
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former to the latter.  Thacker (1999) presents evidence that countries are more likely to receive IMF 
help if they support the United States in other international political matters, like aligning their UN votes 
with America.  Monetary politics is a tool of statecraft, and countries always try to pressure each other 
to advance their own geopolitical agendas.  By embedding one’s country in a dependency relationship, a 
developing country leaves itself vulnerable to such power plays. 
Choices for Latin America and Eastern Europe 
Financial pressures are a perpetual concern for governments, particularly during historical 
periods in which international capital is mobile and powerful, as is the case today.  In our current 
context, in which the capitalist system is experiencing financial instability at its core, the prospect of 
turbulence seems especially strong.  Governments in Latin America and Eastern Europe will have to find 
ways to buffer themselves in this environment.  However, these regions face particular circumstances 
that influence the viability of different strategies. 
In Eastern Europe, policy-makers have sought protection by embedding their systems in the 
European Monetary Union, and thus under the auspices of Western Europe’s major continental powers.  
Such a solution presents gold-standard protection from market pressures, and presents a range of clear 
non-monetary benefits to member countries (e.g., lower transaction costs with Western Europe, a 
friendlier investment environment for enterprises that serve the Euro area, or the reduction of exchange 
rate uncertainty).  Furthermore, the regulations governing Union membership encourage monetary 
discipline, thus conferring some of the benefits sought in the post-1980s pursuit of liberal incentivization 
strategies. 
Here, the long-term concerns of such an arrangement are the other means by which such an 
arrangement ties the hands of government.  The EMU can be a coordinative or dependency relationship, 
depending on the tenor of the policies taken by its central bank, which is itself constrained by the 
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politics of its powerful countries.  Such a change can occur in situations where the interests of the 
Union’s core members see a divergence from those of the East.  By adopting the Euro, Eastern 
Europeans are foregoing an ability to tailor monetary and exchange rate policies to suit the exigencies of 
the particular local pressures they face.  In effect, adopting the Euro is a solution that foregoes 
governments’ political control over the money system to combat a loss of policy autonomy on a broader 
range of policy issues due to pressure from a wider range of sources. 
The lingering question here is whether Eastern Europe is entering another kind of Faustian 
bargain, in which it becomes entrenched in a system that ultimately does not treat the region’s 
development as a key priority.  The current situation of Italy is an instructive example, where that 
country could benefit from exchange rate devaluations to spur its struggling export sector.  Under the 
EMU, Germany, France, Finland and Belgium have enjoyed enhanced competitiveness as a result of 
differential inflation, while price disadvantages have been accruing to high inflation countries like Italy, 
Portugal and Spain (Fischer 2007).  This does not suggest that the EMU systematically disadvantages 
weaker or more financially-troubled countries.  One can easily find policies that suggest embattled 
European countries are in a situation for which they are partly responsible.  However, it does highlight 
the difficulties that can occur when a country is deprived of locally-responsive exchange rate and 
monetary policies.  A second potential concern is the use of a monetary union as a vehicle for 
transferring economic burdens from strong to weak countries.  For example, France and Germany have 
repeatedly breached the terms of the Stability and Growth Pact, and the EU repeatedly failed to 
implement the sanctions laid out by the accord (Annett and Jaeger 2004; Wypolsz 2006).  In fact the 
EU’s large countries have been the worst fiscal offenders in the Union, leaving the burden of fiscal 
discipline to its smaller, SGP-compliant members.   
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I do not wish to suggest that Eastern Europe should adopt a strong dose of Euroskepticism in 
matters related to money.  In fact, most observers believe that the benefits of EMU integration are large 
(for example, improved within-continent trade) and that some of the stresses (like asymmetry of shocks) 
will diminish in the long-term (Frankel 2005).  However, pure economics are not the sole determinant of 
central banking policy.  Bretton Woods itself became mired in problems when the US used its monetary 
power to finance the Vietnam War, and local political currents in the core EMU countries have the 
capacity to pressure EU policy if a strong enough will develops.  The point being made here is that 
integration into the Euro zone entails deep institutional changes that cannot be undone easily, and 
those that make the leap will have to remain cognizant of, and develop explicit economic and political 
strategies for, the dependency relations that will develop. 
In Latin America, no such gold standard insulation from international market forces seems to be 
available.  Monetary union – either among themselves or with the US through dollarization – looks like a 
poor option.  The former choice, by many analyses, does not seem to make economic sense.  Latin 
American countries do not trade much with each other, and different parts of the region experience an 
asymmetry of economic shocks, implying that there are few gains resulting from economizing on 
transaction costs and a unified response to shocks would probably always make someone unhappy 
(Belke and Gros 2002; Edwards 2006; Hochreither, Schmidt-Hebbel and Winckler 2002).  The second 
option – dollarization – is likely to produce a monetary policy that is completely unresponsive to local 
economic conditions, and makes less sense as Latin America trades more with other countries.  
America’s economy has little exposure to Latin American fortunes (except perhaps Mexico), and a long 
history of indifference to that region’s development, compared with what seems to be Western 
Europe’s current attitudes towards the East. 
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Barring any serious concerted effort to bring the real economies of Latin America together, that 
region’s countries are forced to seek monetary autonomy on their own.  Incentivization remains an 
important part of such a strategy, because the region generally lacks the public finances or robust trade 
sectors to forego foreign investment.  Furthermore, financial governance in that region has been – and 
often continues to be – loose and in need of some sort of discipline.  For some observers, finding ways 
to constrain monetary policy is paramount for the financial stabilization of Latin America (Mishkin and 
Savastano 2000).  Some countries, notably Brazil, do look strong, and have been able to generally 
potentially strong export markets and accumulation Asian-style massive reserves.  Others, like 
Venezuela, appear to be stuck in policies that led to the continent’s financial demise in the 1980s. 
In wide measure, Latin American countries have sought to deal with their problems through 
intervention, resorting to technically clever policy devices like flexible pegging or inflation targeting, and 
these policies are believed to have helped fight inflation (e.g., Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel 2001).  Latin 
America has never had a lack of economic expertise, and most cutting-edge strategies ultimately have a 
limited shelf life.  A key question is whether the region’s recent successes are context-dependent – a 
product of general calm in international capital flows and a global commodity boom – or whether these 
successes are the result of rock-solid strategies with real long-term viability.  If we conceptualize this 
region’s financial dealings as the product of economic power, rather than flows and balances, this region 
does not command the strength wielded by other middle-income regions.  They remain economically 
dependent, although recent distancing from IMF or US export market reliance may be helpful.  True 
autonomy probably requires political changes on a range of issues, like enhancing regional trade or 
fortifying individual national finances.  This is hardly a new perspective, but the issues still remain 
pertinent. 
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More broadly, improved financial stability in the developing world could be helped by changing 
attitudes in the developed world.  Often, there exists an implicit assumption – justified or not – that 
financial calamity and its associated political problems are attributable to victim countries.  The 
sentiment is encoded in the language of monetary policy when we discuss “discipline”, as if these 
governments were gourmands who need to stop gorging themselves, or unruly schoolboys in need of 
detention.  This may be partly true, but it neglects the role that the rich world has played in fostering 
these problems – the 1982 debt crisis was prompted by irresponsible US private lending and the 
currency crises by narrow, US-mandated policy prescriptions , playing at least the role of an enabler of 
bad decisions, and these economic problems are likely contributors to governance problems.   
In our quest for good governance in the developing world, developed countries (particularly the 
US) might do well to recognize that they themselves are likely to be stung by the private markets  that 
they have done much to nurture, despite any assumption of fundamentally good governance here.  
Developing countries can be helped by genuine attitudes that government can be working towards their 
own economic good, and that bad policies there are often the byproduct of political complexities with 
which we have to deal here.  If the First World genuinely wants to help the Third, its monetary policies 
might see some interest in providing more non-disciplinary help.  The benefits of such an attitude could 
extend well beyond the economic, tempering negative attitudes towards globalization, the North or the 
US specifically.  Doing so would rob bad governments of a tried-and-true scapegoat. 
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